Restrictions and controls made on law abiding citizens are done so for one purpose, to control the people. The last gun confiscation by the government did nothing to make the populace safer, on the contrary, home invasions have increased along with other violent crimes.
Australians are given no legal right to carry anything for use in self defence.
National
Counter-Terrorism Committee
NATIONAL
GUIDELINES for the PROTECTION of PLACES of MASS GATHERING from TERRORISM
Contents
Introduction 3
Purpose 3
Definition 4
Security
context 4
Principles 4
Process
for engaging with places of mass gathering
at risk
from terrorism 5
Risk
management in the current environment 5
Roles
and responsibilities of key stakeholders in the
protection of places of mass gathering 6
Role of the Commonwealth Government 6
Role of the State and Territory governments 6
Role of State and Territory police 6
Role of
the National Counter-Terrorism Committee 7
Role of
owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers 7
Role of
Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG) 7
Role of
the Business Advisory Group (BAG) 8
Roles of
peak bodies and associations 8
Distribution
of relevant intelligence and information/communications protocols Current
security context Introduction
In November
2009, COAG SOM agreed to recommendations of the Review of the National Critical
Infrastructure Protection Arrangements, including that work relating to the
protection of places of mass gathering should be coordinated by the National
Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).
In December
2009, NCTC noted that the protection of places of mass gathering is most
effectively delivered through a business government partnership, and agreed to
coordinate at a national level, work associated with protecting places of mass
gathering. In December 2010, NCTC agreed to establish the Mass Gatherings
Strategy Group (MGSG) to operate as a national forum to share information on
issues and best practice relating to the protection of places of mass gathering
from terrorism.
NCTC
also agreed to establish a consultative forum with business comprising national
and major venue owners and operators, through a Business Advisory Group (BAG),
to exchange information, and engage with law enforcement authorities to discuss
Australia-wide issues relevant to the protection of places of mass gathering.
Purpose
Places
of mass gathering not only present terrorists with potential opportunities for
mass casualties, symbolism and high impact media coverage, they pose a broad
range of security challenges for their owners and operators. NCTC noted that places
of mass gathering have been specifically identified by religious and political
extremists as attractive targets.
All
jurisdictions have robust and well tested arrangements for the planning and
management of major and specific events. However, determining which places of
mass gathering are at higher risk is not an easy task given the sheer number
and variations of such places, and the limited security resources available.
Once identified, they further present the challenge of what consistent risk
mitigation strategies to develop and implement.
This
document has been developed to ensure a nationally consistent approach is taken
by all Australian jurisdictions in the development of their own guidelines for
the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism. The approach
supports a systematic process identifying security risk management activities
which can be integrated into existing jurisdictional emergency management
arrangements. It provides a basis for:
• identifying places of mass gathering that
are vulnerable to the threat of terrorism, and
• risk management arrangements associated
with this threat, based on the roles and responsibilities shared among all
private and public stakeholders.
Definition
Places
of mass gathering incorporate a diverse range of facilities including, but not
limited to, sporting venues, shopping and business precincts, tourism/entertainment
venues/attractions, hotels and convention centres, major events and public
transport hubs. This also includes significant one off events. They are
characterised by having a large concentration of people on a predictable basis
and often have a minimum of security controls present. Identification of places
of mass gathering for the purpose of this document is based on risk and not on
any arbitrary numerical threshold.
Given
the pervasive threat to a diverse range of targets, the identification of
places of mass gathering cannot be precise.
The
identification of places of mass gathering potentially at risk from terrorism
should be informed by the current security context.
The current
security context for mass gatherings is provided by the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO) and is at Annexure A.
Places
of mass gathering are potential targets for terrorist attack, particularly in
larger cities, as they may satisfy the following criteria:
• provide opportunity for attack in terms
of accessibility and vulnerability
• cause high-impact imagery likely to be
generated by an attack
• have high symbolic value, and
• have consequences in terms of mass
casualties, economic impact and public anxiety in the broader community.
By
concentrating large numbers of people at high density in accessible places, at
regular or predictable times, mass gatherings present the opportunity for
terrorists to inflict mass casualties, cause economic damage, and instil public
fear.
Places
of mass gathering, or the events themselves, may have symbolic value, or be
representative of Western culture. Furthermore, any terrorist attack against a
place of mass gathering would generate considerable media interest.
Principles
The national
approach is based on the following principles:
• counter-terrorism preparedness for places
of mass gathering focuses on the protection and safety of people
• all levels of government contribute to
the prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery from a terrorist incident, including local government
recovery from a terrorist incident, including local government
• event managers and owners and operators
of places of mass gathering are responsible for taking reasonable steps to
ensure the protection and safety of people
• prevention and preparedness arrangements
for protection from terrorism are
underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach
underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach
• security arrangements for places of mass
gathering recognise the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat and are
responsive to changes in the security environment, and
• effective security outcomes in complex
mass gathering environments require cooperation and coordination between all
stakeholders.
Note: security
at public transport hubs is considered more specifically under the Inter-Governmental
Agreement on Surface Transport Security.
Process
for engaging with places of mass gathering at risk from terrorism
The
national approach relies on an active business government partnership. This
partnership will be achieved through three principal methods of engagement
based on an intelligence-led, risk management process.
• Guided self assessment: all owners and
operators of places of mass gathering have an obligation to consider the risk
of terrorism in their security and emergency planning processes. Governments should
make available tools through which owners and operators can self assess the
risk of terrorism to their operation.
• Top down: intelligence-led advice will be
provided to owners and operators when relevant.
• Bottom up: specific responses to
enquiries from industry/owners and operators about the threat of terrorism to
their operations will be provided. The exchange of information and engagement
with law enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to
the protection of places of mass gathering will occur via the BAG.
Risk management
in the current environment
The
Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009)
is the standard by which all places of mass gathering will be assessed. In
accordance with ISO 31000:2009, it is first necessary to establish the
strategic context for actual and potential threats. In the current security
environment, all security risk assessment processes should consider terrorism
in all its forms. Refer to Annexure A.
Following
completion of an assessment, the development of appropriate security and
on-site emergency management plans may be an appropriate treatment strategy.
Additionally owners and operators should engage with State and Territory and local
governments regarding recovery issues.
Roles and
responsibilities of key stakeholders in the protection of places of mass gathering
Role of
the Commonwealth Government
The Commonwealth
Government has responsibility to:
• communicate relevant intelligence and
information to State and Territory government stakeholders, and other relevant
stakeholders
• participate in the promulgation of a
nationally consistent approach to the protection of places of mass gatherings
• where relevant, liaise with and support State
and Territory governments in providing protective security arrangements for
places of mass gathering
• regulate aviation and maritime industry
participants, based on a preventative security approach
• assist industry through peak bodies and
advisory groups as appropriate
• coordinate the establishment of a task
force for major events where Commonwealth Government action is required, and
• manage and coordinate public information
and the media at a national level.
Role of
State and Territory governments
State
and Territory governments have responsibility to:
• provide leadership and
whole-of-government coordination in implementing the nationally consistent
approach for the protection of places of mass gathering by providing owners and
operators with jurisdictionally or otherwise developed guidance material
• where relevant liaise with the Commonwealth
Government on mass gathering protection arrangements
• communicate relevant information through
jurisdictionally agreed arrangements, and
• manage and coordinate public information
and the media within the jurisdiction.
Role of
State and Territory police
Where
appropriate, State and Territory police have responsibility to:
• assist in the provision of protective
security guidance (as deemed appropriate by the respective police
service/force) to event organisers and owners and operators of places of mass
gathering and develop protective security strategies to counter terrorism
• advise event organisers and owners and
operators of places of mass gathering of relevant threat information, in
accordance with jurisdictional arrangements
• communicate directly with owners and operators
of places of mass gathering where there is an imminent and specific threat and
coordinate the operational response, and
• establish and maintain liaison with
owners and operators of places of mass gathering in accordance with
jurisdictional arrangements.
State
and Territory police also have operational responsibility for preventing and
responding to acts of terrorism and investigate terrorist activity, threats and
incidents.
Role of the
National Counter-Terrorism Committee
The NCTC
(senior representatives from relevant Commonwealth Government agencies and
First Ministers’ departments and police from each jurisdiction) has
responsibility to build national capability and promote the protection of
places of mass gathering in a manner consistent with broader counter-terrorism
arrangements. The NCTC supports the operation of the MGSG to provide a conduit
for the national exchange of information within a government and business
partnership via collaboration with the BAG. This model seeks to create a
culture of collaboration between stakeholders to improve Australia’s capacity to
operate in a heightened terrorism environment.
Role of
owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers
Owners
and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers are encouraged to:
maintain
an awareness of their operating environment
provide
adequate security for their assets, based on threat and risk
actively
apply risk management techniques to their planning processes
conduct
regular reviews of risk assessments and security, emergency and contingency
plans
report
any incidents or suspicious activity to State or Territory police
develop
and regularly review business continuity plans, including identifying
interdependencies
conduct
training and exercise their security, emergency and contingency plans, and
participate
in government exercises to assist in harmonising prevention, response and recovery
arrangements with relevant controlling agencies.
Role of
the Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG)
The MGSG
shall:
provide
a forum for all jurisdictions to share information, initiate strategies and/or oversight
activities on issues and best practice relating to the protection of places of
mass gathering from terrorism, and
supplement
and support existing or proposed arrangements within jurisdictions, and
coordinate at a national level the work associated with protecting places of
mass gathering, recognising the varying capabilities of jurisdictions.
Role of
the Business Advisory Group (BAG)
The BAG
shall:
• operate as a forum for national and major
venue owners and operators to exchange information, and engage with law
enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to the
protection of places of mass gathering.
Roles of
peak bodies and associations
Peak bodies
and associations are encouraged to disseminate and promote information in
consultation with the BAG to support the nationally consistent approach to the
protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism.
Distribution
of relevant intelligence and information/communications protocols
ASIO is
the national assessing authority for security threat assessments and security
intelligence reports (SIR). Threat assessments and SIR are prepared on the
basis of information available from Commonwealth Government, State and Territory
resources, overseas liaison and open sources. From time to time, specific risks
or threats may emerge that require an immediate response. On these occasions, a
well coordinated but more operationally focussed response will be required from
governments and industry.
Responsibility
for the distribution of relevant intelligence and information is summarised
below.
• ASIO has responsibility to provide
intelligence to relevant Commonwealth Government departments and agencies, the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and State and Territory police.
• In the knowledge of an imminent and
specific threat, ASIO will liaise with the State and Territory police, owners
and operators of places of mass gathering and other relevant stakeholders.
• State and Territory police liaise with
relevant owners and operators of places of mass gathering, in accordance with
jurisdictional arrangements, to provide information on the national and localised
security threat context. Police will communicate directly with key bodies where
there is an imminent and specific threat and will coordinate the operational
response. Police also gather and disseminate intelligence to relevant agencies
as required and as appropriate.
• State and Territory governments liaise
with relevant owners and operators of places of mass gathering, in accordance
with jurisdictional arrangements, to promote the harmonisation of prevention,
response and recovery plans between governments and owners and operators of
places of mass gathering.
• The owners and operators of places of
mass gathering and event organisers are expected to provide adequate security
of their assets, including staff and pass information to the police on
incidents and specific activities such as hoaxes/threats, unusual purchases or
thefts, unusual training, or apparent surveillance.
While
some overlap may occur in information being passed from industry peak bodies to
their constituency and the mechanisms within States and Territories, this is
preferable to the possibility that information might not be passed to some
owners and operators of places of mass gathering.
Current security
context
The main
terrorist threat to Australia emanates from al-Qa’ida (AQ) and Islamist
terrorists inspired by AQ’s world view. Public statements by AQ figures and
other extremists continue to criticise Australia, and identify Australians and
Australian interests as legitimate targets.
Despite
international counter-terrorism efforts, AQ retains the intent and capability
to conduct terrorist attacks and to operationally influence like-minded
terrorist networks to undertake attacks. The threat to Australian interests
domestically and overseas from AQ like-minded groups will endure for the
foreseeable future.
Critical
infrastructure and places of mass gathering feature prominently in terrorist
attacks linked to AQ and its affiliates – characterised by their symbolic
nature, concentration of people in enclosed spaces and economic and social
importance. Terrorist attacks have targeted government buildings, diplomatic
and consular offices, commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist
facilities, residential compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation,
oil and other energy and transport infrastructure. The aviation sector remains
a particular focus for AQ and its affiliates.
AQ and
like-minded terrorist networks have considered, undertaken and trained for a
range of attack methodologies, including suicide bombing using person-borne and
vehicle-borne (car, truck, boat and plane) improvised explosive devices,
assassination, missile attack and remote-control truck bombing.
Conventional
and improvised weapons remain the primary feature of terrorist attacks, despite
terrorist groups having an interest in, and having ready access to, information
on cyber attacks and on weapons of mass destruction. Innovation and ingenuity
in circumventing security measures is a feature of terrorist attacks. However,
past plots may not provide a basis for future attack planning.
Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation
September
2010
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