Sunday, March 26, 2017

Have You Read The New National Firearms Agreement For Australia?!


I don't think many people have noticed the changes to protection rights in the new 2017 NFA. It clearly states that using a gun for the defence of your family, friends or yourself is no longer considered a legal right! Bad enough that we have lost certain guns, bad enough that it is not legal to purchase a gun for self defence, but it was until now understood that if we had no other choice, we could under certain circumstances use a gun for defence of ourselves & our family.

What can it mean when a government wants to disarm citizens? What can it mean if it denies citizens the right to self protection against armed criminals? Practically every day in Australia people are being attacked, raped & murdered, & yet the government has now done all it can to stop us from protecting ourselves. Something is very wrong here!

Fighting for Your Rights Against the New NFA

Saturday, March 25, 2017

National Firearms Agreement Australia 2017. Personal protection is not a genuine reason for using a firearm!!!


Personal protection is not a genuine reason for using a firearm. 

NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT Council of Australian Governments An agreement between n the Commonwealth of Australia and n the States and Territories, being: t The State of New South Wales t The State of Victoria t The State of Queensland t The State of Western Australia t The State of South Australia t The State of Tasmania t The Australian Capital Territory t The Northern Territory of Australia February 2017 2 of 14 NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT OPENING STATEMENT 1. The National Firearms Agreement constitutes a national approach to the regulation of firearms. The Agreement affirms that firearms possession and use is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, and that public safety is improved by the safe and responsible possession, carriage, use, registration, storage and transfer of firearms. 2. This Agreement sets out minimum requirements in relation to the regulation of firearms. Nothing in this Agreement prevents jurisdictions from adopting additionalincluding more restrictiveregulations. 3. Having regard to the National Firearms Trafficking Policy Agreement, first agreed in 2002, jurisdictions agree to establish or maintain substantial penalties for the illegal possession of a firearm. PROVISION TO MAINTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 4. The Council of Australian Governments and its subordinate bodies will periodically consider emerging issues relating to this Agreement, including, for example, improvements and advancements in firearm technologies. Issues for consideration will be those which will ensure that the Agreement remains true to its fundamental aspects, being: the requirement for a genuine reason for possessing or using a firearm, the appropriate categorisation of firearms, the registration of firearms, firearms licensing (including fit and proper person requirements), the requirement for a permit to acquire each firearm, the safe and secure storage of firearms, the recording of firearms sales, and suitable firearms transaction practices. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FIREARMS 5. The Commonwealth will restrict the importation of: (a) all semi-automatic long arms and pump action shotguns, and all partsincluding magazinesfor such firearms, included in Licence Categories C and D (b) magazines with a capacity greater than thirty for long arms and magazines with a capacity greater than twenty for handguns (c) all handguns for sporting shooting purposes other than those which meet the prescribed characteristicsincluding barrel length, magazine capacity and calibrein paragraph 14(b)(i) (d) handgun parts for sport shooting purposes (for example slides, barrels, receivers and frames) which could be used to assemble a prohibited handgun or convert a permitted handgun into a prohibited handgun. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 3 of 14 6. Jurisdictions will ban the sale, resale, transfer, possession, manufacture and use of those semi-automatic long arms and pump action shotguns included in Licence Category C and D other than in the following exceptional circumstances: (a) military use (b) police or other government purposes (c) occupational categories of licence holders who have been licensed for a specified purpose, including i. the extermination of animals ii. film and theatrical armourers iii. firearm dealers iv. firearm manufacturers v. additional occupational needs and other limited purposes as authorised by legislation or Ministerial discretion (d) collectors (e) in the case of Category C shotguns i. members of the Australian Clay Target Association or clubs affiliated with the Australian Clay Target Association with a medical need to use a Category C shotgun due to a lack of strength or dexterity, or ii. individuals who were on 15 November 1996 registered shooters with the Australian Clay Target Association and who, at that time, possessed a semi-automatic shotgun or pump action repeating shotgun for use in clay target events. 7. Jurisdictions will restrict the importation, possession and use of handguns for sporting purposes to individuals meeting recognised sporting shooter classifications in the Olympic and Commonwealth Games and for other accredited events that meet the conditions in paragraph 14(b)(i). 8. Jurisdictions will ban competitive shooting involving those long arms which are restricted from import, except for those individuals who meet the conditions in paragraph 13(b)(iii). GENUINE REASONS AND NEED FOR ACQUIRING, POSSESSING OR USING A FIREARM 9. Individuals must demonstrate a genuine reason for acquiring, possessing or using a firearm. The genuine reasons and relevant qualifying statements are listed in paragraphs 13-23. 10. Personal protection is not a genuine reason for acquiring, possessing or using a firearm. 11. Over and above satisfaction of the “genuine reason” test, an applicant for a licence must demonstrate a genuine need for the particular type of firearm (excluding Category A firearms). 12. Only certain categories of firearms can be acquired, possessed or used under each genuine reason. Categories of firearms are listed in paragraphs 25-29. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 4 of 14 GENUINE REASONS 13. Sports shooters – long arms (a) Sports shooters must have a valid membership with an approved club (defined as clubs participating in shooting sports recognised in the charters of such major sporting events as the Commonwealth Games, Olympic Games or World Championships). (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category A ii. Category B iii. Category C shotguns, limited to 1 members of the Australian Clay Target Association or clubs affiliated with the Australian Clay Target Association with a medical need to use a Category C shotgun due to a lack of strength or dexterity, or 2 individuals who were on 15 November 1996 registered shooters with the Australian Clay Target Association and who, at that time, possessed a semi-automatic shotgun or pump action repeating shotgun for use in clay target events. 14. Sports shooters – handguns (a) Sports shooters must have a valid membership with an approved club. (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category H – the firearm must be designed or adapted for competition target shooting, or must have a barrel length of at least 120mm for a semi-automatic handgun or 100mm for a revolver or a single shot handgun. If the firearm is fitted with a firearm magazine or cylinder, it must have a capacity of not more than 10 rounds. The calibre of the firearm must not exceed .38” (with the exception of cases listed under paragraph 14(c)). (c) Handguns with a calibre greater than .38” but no greater than .45” are permitted only where shooters are competing in the two accredited events known as Metallic Silhouette and Single (Western) Action. 15. Recreational shooters/hunters (a) Recreational shooters/hunters must produce proof of permission from a landowner. (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category A ii. Category B 16. Primary producers (a) Primary producers must satisfy the licensing authority that there is a genuine need for the use of the firearm which pertains to the applicant’s occupation and which cannot be achieved by some other means. The application is to be approved by the Commissioner of the Police who may impose conditions as to the use of the firearms, including as to the geographical location of its use. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 5 of 14 (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category A ii. Category B iii. Category C – where the licensing authority is satisfied that there is a genuine need for the use of the firearm which cannot be achieved by some other means (including the use of Category A or B firearms). Primary producers are limited to one Category C shotgun and one Category C rifle iv. Category D – where the licensing authority is satisfied that there is a genuine need for the use of a Category D firearm for the purposes of controlling vertebrate pest animals in the course of primary production activities. Jurisdictions may require individuals to meet additional requirements (for example, safety training and marksmanship) to qualify for Category D acquisition, possession or use, or to establish certain facts (for example, lack of other pest control options) in order to demonstrate need. 17. Occupational requirement (other rural purposes and professional shooters for nominated purposes) (a) Persons with an occupational interest must satisfy the licensing authority that there is a genuine need for the use of the firearm which pertains to the applicant’s occupation and which cannot be achieved by some other means. The application is to be approved by the Commissioner of the Police who may impose conditions as to the use of the firearms, including as to the geographical location of its use. (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category A ii. Category B 18. Security employees (a) Firearms permitted for acquisition, possession or use under this genuine reason are: i. Category A ii. Category H 19. Collectors (a) Collectors will be regulated by means of a licence and permit system which tests their bona fides. (b) Firearms permitted for acquisition and possession under this genuine reason are: i. Category A – must be rendered temporarily inoperable ii. Category B – must be rendered temporarily inoperable iii. Category C – must be rendered temporarily inoperable iv. Category D – must be rendered permanently inoperable v. Category H – must be rendered temporarily inoperable (c) For the purposes of handguns, jurisdictions agree that they will accredit historical societies. Historical societies are required to notify police of a member’s expulsion as well as the reasons for expulsion. Accredited historical societies will be indemnified from civil or legal liability where they notify police in good faith of their belief that a person is unfit to hold a collector’s licence. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 6 of 14 20. Heirlooms (a) Jurisdictions agree that where the owner of an heirloom firearm is unable to establish a genuine reason for possession of that firearm and/or does not qualify for a collector’s licence, jurisdictions may issue the heirloom owner with a special category of licence. The requirements of that heirloom licence must be that: i. before the licence is issued, the owner provides sufficient proof of inheritance of the heirloom ii. the licence apply only to a single gun, or a matched pair or set iii. all heirloom firearms be rendered permanently inoperable iv. the licence not authorise the discharge of the heirloom firearm or firearms in any circumstance. 21. Firearm dealers (a) Jurisdictions must have regulations addressing firearm dealers. 22. Firearm manufacturers (a) Jurisdictions must have regulations addressing firearm manufacturers. 23. Film and/or theatrical armourers (a) Jurisdictions must have regulations addressing film and theatrical armourers. CATEGORIES OF FIREARMS 24. The following categories are to be used in the licensing of firearms. 25. Licence Category A (a) Air rifles (b) Rimfire rifles (excluding semi-automatic) (c) Shotguns (other than semi-automatic, pump action or lever action) (d) Rimfire rifle/shotgun combinations 26. Licence Category B (a) Muzzle-loading firearms (b) Single shot, double barrel and repeating centrefire rifles (c) Centrefire rifle/shotgun combinations (d) Lever action shotguns with a magazine capacity no greater than five rounds 27. Licence Category C (a) Semi-automatic rimfire rifles with a magazine capacity no greater than 10 rounds (b) Semi-automatic and pump action shotguns with a magazine capacity no greater than five rounds 28. Licence Category D (a) Semi-automatic centrefire rifles designed or adapted for military purposes or a firearm which substantially duplicates those rifles in design, function or appearance (b) Non-military style self-loading centrefire rifles NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 7 of 14 (c) Semi-automatic, pump action and lever action shotguns with a magazine capacity greater than five rounds (d) Semi-automatic rimfire rifles with a magazine capacity greater than 10 rounds 29. Licence Category H (a) All handguns, including air pistols NATIONWIDE REGISTRATION 30. Jurisdictions agree to the nationwide registration of all firearms. Jurisdictions will record sufficient information to be able to uniquely identify each firearm, including details prescribed by the national information-sharing hub. 31. Jurisdictions agree to store registrations on a system which is able to share information with the national information-sharing hub. LICENSING 32. Jurisdictions agree to maintain a uniform system of testing applicants for firearms licences. 33. In addition to the demonstration of genuine reason, a licence applicant must be required to: (a) be aged 18 or over (b) be a fit and proper person (c) be able to prove identity through a 100 point system requiring a passport or multiple types of identification (d) undertake adequate safety training (see paragraph 35). 34. A licence must: (a) bear a photograph of the licensee (b) be endorsed with the category of the firearm (c) be issued after a waiting period of not less than 28 days (d) be issued for a period of no more than five years (e) contain a reminder of safe storage responsibilities (f) be issued subject to undertakings to comply with storage requirements, to provide details of proposed storage provisions at the time of licensing, and to submit to a mutually arranged (with due recognition of privacy) inspection by licensing authorities of storage facilities. 35. Requisite training (a) Jurisdictions agree that first time licence applicants must complete an accredited course in safety training for firearms. The course must be: i. comprehensive and standardised across Australia for all licence categories ii. subject to accreditation of the course syllabus, by an appropriate authority, and a system of accredited instructors to bring prospective licensees to the required standard with a focus on firearms law, firearms safety and firearms competency NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 8 of 14 iii. monitored as to content of courses and the skills of instructors by firearms regulatory authorities. (b) Jurisdictions agree to have a separate specialised training course for individuals employed by the security industry. 36. Sports shooters – handguns (a) Sports shooters must have a valid membership with an approved club. i. Clubs will have the power to request a police check on a person prior to accepting them as a member of a club. ii. A person applying to join a club must provide that club with two character references from people they have known for at least two years. iii. Clubs must endorse a member’s application to acquire a handgun. In endorsing the application, clubs should: 1 confirm that the licensee has adequate storage arrangements in place 2 specify for which competition shooting discipline the handgun is required. iv. To prevent ‘club shopping’, a person wishing to join a club must provide to that club details of any other shooting clubs to which they belong and details of the firearms they possess. In addition, clubs are empowered to request information from licensing authorities on a member’s or applicant’s possession of handguns and their membership of other clubs. v. Shooting clubs are required to provide licensing authorities with an audited annual report providing member details, firearms possessed, and participation rates. (b) Jurisdictions agree to a system for graduated access to handguns for legitimate sporting shooters based on training, experience and event participation. The system will be based on graduated access to handguns over a period of 12 months and will incorporate the following principles: i. a person is required to obtain a police check and submit this with their application to join a shooting club ii. during the first six months a person will not be permitted to own a handgun, must satisfactorily complete a firearm safety training course and meet minimum participation rates iii. if a club certifies that a person has satisfactorily complied with the conditions attached to the first six months’ probation, then during the second six months a person will only be permitted to own one .22” calibre rimfire pistol and one .177” air pistol, or one centrefire pistol and one .177” calibre air pistol. (c) After the initial period of 12 months, acquisition of additional handguns is subject to demonstration of genuine need, confirmation that the licensee has adequate storage arrangements in place, and specification of the competition shooting discipline for which the handgun is required. 37. Collectors (a) The licensing process must include a provision for an initial inspection of storage facilities and for subsequent mutually arranged inspections. All such inspections will be subject to the recognition of the individual’s right to privacy. The onus of defining NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 9 of 14 ‘bona fide firearms collector’ rests with each State and Territory. However, the following principles must underpin the regulation of bona fide firearms collectors: i. the firearms which are the subject of the collection should be of or above a defined age ii. firearms in a collection which have been manufactured after 1 January 1946 must be rendered inoperable (whether or not they are otherwise only required to be rendered temporarily inoperable according to paragraph 19(b)) iii. collectors may not possess ammunition for a collection firearm iv. any attempt to restore firearms in the collection to usable condition should be regarded as a serious offence and subject to severe penalties v. all operating firearms which are owned by the collector under separate licensing arrangements should be subject to the same level of regulation as any other operating firearm vi. for the purposes of the collection of Category H firearms, genuine historical collectors must 1 be a member of a state or territory accredited historical firearm collectors society 2 have their licence application endorsed by an accredited historical firearms collectors society 3 comply with strict storage requirements 4 display a commitment as a student of arms in order to collect or retain post-1946 handguns. 38. Grounds for licence refusal or cancellation and seizure of firearms (a) Jurisdictions agree to set out in legislation the circumstances in which licence applications (including renewals) are to be refused, licences are to be cancelled, or firearms are to be seized. The following minimum standards must apply: i. general reasons – not of good character, conviction for an offence involving violence within the past five years, unsafe storage, contravention of firearms law, where it can be shown that the loss or theft of a firearm was due to negligence or fraud on the part of the licensee, no longer has a genuine reason, not in public interest due to (defined) circumstances, not notifying of change of address, or licence obtained by deception ii. specific reasons – where applicant/licence holder has been the subject of an Apprehended Violence Order, Domestic Violence Order, restraining order or conviction for assault with a weapon/aggravated assault within the past five years iii. mental or physical fitness – reliable evidence of a mental or physical condition which would render the applicant unsuitable for acquiring, possessing or using a firearm. (b) In regard to 38(a)(iii), a balance is to be struck between the rights of the individual to privacy and fair treatment, and the responsibility of authoritieson behalf of the communityto prevent danger to the individual and the wider community. (c) Jurisdictions may impose appropriate penalties, in addition to licence cancellation or seizure of firearms, for failure to comply with security and storage conditions. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 10 of 14 (d) Jurisdictions will establish an appeal process for refusal of a licence application or cancellation of a licence. (e) Specifically in relation to the cancellation of Category H licences, jurisdictions agree: i. to introduce or maintain laws allowing the Commissioner of Police to refuse and revoke handgun licences and applications on the basis of criminal intelligence or any other relevant information with consideration to appropriate safeguards including expert advice ii. that members of approved shooting clubs be required to attend a minimum number of shooting events offered by the club, and that failure to meet the minimum participation level will make a person liable to have their licence revoked iii. that sporting shooters meet minimum participation rates annually, specifically that a sports shooter must participate in a minimum number of six club organised competitive shooting matches, and for each different type of handgun owned for different events the sporting shooter must undertake at least four club organised shoots iv. that clubs must notify licensing authorities of concerns about club members’ suitability to hold a licence, and indemnify clubs for providing such information to licensing authorities about the suitability of club members to hold a licence. In particular, jurisdictions will 1 require sporting shooting clubs to report to police their concerns that a person may pose a danger if in possession of a handgun 2 require sporting shooting clubs to notify police of a member’s expulsion and the reasons for expulsion 3 indemnify sporting shooting clubs from civil or legal liability if they notify police in good faith of matters identified in paragraphs 38(e)(iv)(1) and 38(e)(iv)(2) 4 require sporting shooting clubs to ensure that a person whose licence has been revoked or suspended does not use a handgun at the sporting club v. to support the operation of the fit and proper person test throughout the life of the licence allowing for the licensing authorities’ revocation of a person’s licence and seizure of handguns on grounds of not being a fit and proper person at any time vi. to require suspension/cancellation of licences and seizure of firearms immediately upon the issue of an Apprehended Violence Order or Domestic Violence Order to a firearm licence holder. 39. Medical authorities reporting model (a) Jurisdictions agree that reporting provisions for medical authorities be improved or maintained by indemnifying medical authorities from civil or criminal liability for reporting in good faith to police their concerns that a person may pose a danger if in possession of a firearm or applying for a firearm licence. This is providing that ‘medical authorities’ include medical practitioners, nurses, social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists and professional counsellors. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 11 of 14 40. Mutual recognition (a) Jurisdictions will recognise visiting licensees for the following firearms and purposes: i. Category A and B – sporting, recreational hunting and any other lawful purpose ii. Category C – sporting and any other lawful purpose iii. Category H – sporting and any other lawful purpose (b) Category D and other categories of firearms not listed in this Agreement are not subject to mutual recognition provisions. (c) Where an individual is moving permanently to a new jurisdiction, that jurisdiction will recognise: i. for a period no more than three months, a Category A or B licence issued in another jurisdiction ii. for a period no more than seven days, a Category C, D or H licence issued in another jurisdiction. PERMIT TO ACQUIRE 41. Jurisdictions agree that a separate permit is required for the acquisition of every firearm. 42. Jurisdictions agree that each applicant must establish, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, that they have a genuine need for acquiring, possessing or using the firearm of the nominated type (excluding Category A firearms). 43. Jurisdictions agree that the issuing of a permit must be subject to a waiting period of at least 28 days to enable appropriate checks to be made on licensees in order to ascertain whether circumstances have occurred since the issuing of the original licence which would render the licensee unsuitable to possess the firearm or which would render the licensee ineligible for that type of firearm. STORAGE 44. Jurisdictions agree that firearms and ammunition must be stored in secure conditions as follows: (a) it must be a precondition to the issuing of a new firearms licence (and on each renewal of licence in respect of existing licence holders) that the licensing authority be satisfied as to the proposed storage and security arrangements (b) legislation must have the effect of making failure to store firearms in the manner required an offence as well as a matter that will lead to the cancellation of the licence and the confiscation of all firearms (c) clear and specific measures must be indicated in legislation for the storage of firearms so that those who possess firearms know their obligations. The following minimum basic standards must apply: i. Licence Category A and B – storage in a locked receptacle constructed of either hard wood or steel with a thickness to ensure it is not easily penetrable. If the weight is less than 150 kilograms, the receptacle shall be fixed to the frame of the floor or wall so as to prevent easy removal. The locks fitted to these receptacles must be of sturdy construction NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 12 of 14 ii. Licence Category C, D and H – storage in a locked, steel safe with a thickness to ensure it is not easily penetrable, bolted to the structure of a building iii. all ammunition must be stored in locked containers separate from any firearms (d) should individuals possessing a firearm wish to store firearms through measures other than those indicated in legislation, they must have the burden of persuading the firearms regulatory authority that they can provide the level of security not less than that required by the relevant approved practices (e) in order to provide for the safekeeping of firearms when they are temporarily away from their usual place of storage, legislation must include a statement that the holder of the licence "must take reasonable care to ensure that the firearm is not lost or stolen and must take reasonable care to ensure that the firearm does not fall into the hands of an unauthorised person" (f) the firearms safety bookletwhich is to be distributed to all new licence applicants prior to attending a course of instructionmust also feature clear and precise information on the obligations of firearms storage (g) security at gun dealer premises must require the dealer meeting such additional requirements as the firearms regulatory authority deems appropriate having regard to the type of activity of the dealer (h) where approval has been given for the possession or use of a firearm for a limited purpose, such as film production, the person authorised must meet such requirements as the firearms regulatory authority deems appropriate having regard to the type of activity for which possession has been authorised. 45. Jurisdictions should consider imposing greater storage requirements where multiple firearms are kept on the same property. 46. Jurisdictions agree to periodically consider the adequacy of their educational literature on storage to ensure that it emphasises the risk of firearms theft and the legislated requirements for safe storage, and that it highlights compliance monitoring activities and the jurisdiction’s rigorous prosecution policy for non-compliance. 47. Jurisdictions must include a declaration in all licence/permit/renewal application forms which requires the applicant to state that they understand the firearm storage and security requirements as required by legislation. 48. Jurisdictions must have a strategic inspection and audit program for storage requirements. 49. Security industry storage (a) Jurisdictions agree that the following minimum storage requirements represent an appropriate standard for storage of firearms used in the security industry: i. up to five handguns 1 metal safe to be securely fastened to solid floor or wall by internal/hidden bolts and hidden within premises 2 individual disabling locks such as barrel or trigger locks to be fitted to the firearm when stored ii. six to fifteen handguns 1 safes to be a minimum weight of 150kg 2 safes to be secured to or within brick or concrete walls and floors NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 13 of 14 3 premises to be fully intruder alarmed, monitored by a graded control room with back-to-base polling via a secure line (or, if unavailable due to remoteness, with radio or GSM backup) 4 panic switches/duress facility to be installed in the premises iii. over fifteen handguns 1 safes to be a minimum weight of 500kg, with dual key locks 2 safes to be secured to or within brick or concrete walls and floors 3 premises to be fully intruder alarmed, monitored by a graded control room with back-to-base polling via a secure line (or, if unavailable due to remoteness, with radio or GSM backup) 4 panic switches/duress facility to be installed in the premises 5 vaults, control rooms, safes, perimeter and internal premises to maintain 24-hour monitoring and recording by CCTV, which is secured and inaccessible. 50. Jurisdictions may adopt the above standards either by way of legislative requirement or by introducing the standards as guidelines which provide Police Commissioners with limited flexibility for special or unique circumstances. 51. There should be at least one annual inspection of firearms and firearms storage facilities used in the security industry. RECORDING OF SALES 52. All firearms sales are to be conducted only by or through a licenced firearms dealer. 53. Jurisdictions agree to the following principles to underpin firearms dealer recording of firearms transactions: (a) firearms dealers are obliged under penalty to ensure that purchasers are appropriately licenced for the firearm being purchased (b) firearms dealers are required to record and maintain details (type, make, calibre and serial number) of each weapon purchased or sold against the identity (name, address and licence number) of the seller or the purchaser (c) firearms dealers are required to provide records to the national register of firearms through the State or Territory licensing authority (d) police personnel investigating a crime or checking the compliance of licenced gun dealers with recording responsibilities should have the right to inspect the records of licenced gun dealers without the need to give notice to the licensee (e) jurisdictions may put in place alternate options for individuals living in remote locations where firearms dealers are not readily available (it may be possible, for instance, to authorise local police officers to certify sales/purchases in such circumstances). 54. Jurisdictions will legislate to allow the sale of ammunition only for those firearms for which the purchaser is licenced, and impose limits on the quantity of ammunition that may be purchased in a given period. 55. On the purchase of ammunition, the relevant licence must be produced. NATIONAL FIREARMS AGREEMENT 14 of 14 56. Jurisdictions should consider requiring dealers to provide their register of transactions to a relevant authority once that dealer’s licence is no longer valid. This should occur within an appropriate timeframe after the licence has become invalid. SALE AND TRANSPORT OF FIREARMS 57. Jurisdictions will introduce or maintain legislation to ensure that, within their own borders: (a) mail order arrangements (irrespective of how those orders were placed, for example via the telephone or internet) will apply strictly on a licenced firearm dealer to licenced firearm dealer basis (b) advertisement of firearms for sale i. be prohibited unless the sale is conducted by or through a licenced firearms dealer ii. list the licence number of the licensed firearms dealer and the owner selling the firearms, and include the serial number by which the firearms are registered (c) the movement of firearms covered by Licence Categories C, D and H must be in accordance with prescribed safety requirements (d) the commercial transport of ammunition with firearms is prohibited (e) packages containing firearms are able to be tracked (f) packages containing firearms must not be packaged or labelled in such a way as to expressly or otherwise indicate their contents. 58. Jurisdictions may put in place alternative options for individuals living in remote locations where firearms dealers are not readily available.


Thursday, March 23, 2017

Remote Area nurse Safety. Australia.



These nurses work alone, and as we all know it is illegal in Australia to carry anything for self defence. Gayle Woodford was raped and murdered whilst at work. We need new laws that will give people like Gayle and other citizens a better chance of survival when crime is on the increase in Australia. Allowing two nurses to work together is a start, but it is not enough. We need legislation allowing law abiding Australian citizens to carry guns for self defence and if necessary for the defence of others, such as family members. In cases where people do not wish to carry a gun, then tasers and capsicum sprays should be a legal option.

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

‘Gun Violence’ Never Happens in ‘Gun Free’ Australia. Except When it Does.


Now there’s a scenario for you: an unarmed defenceless father and five teenagers hiding from three intruders who’ve shown that they are ready, willing and able to use deadly force.
Thankfully, the home invaders left. They’re still at large. And Australians are still defenseless against armed criminals. Anyone care to repeat the Australian model of gun control here? The scary part? The answer to that question is yes.

A Woodsrunner's Diary: Part Four. A Closer Look At Flint & Steel Fire Lig...

A Woodsrunner's Diary: Part Four. A Closer Look At Flint & Steel Fire Lig...: Plant Tinders. All of the plant tinders I have found I have discovered through experimentation before I read 18th century accounts. Some o...

Monday, March 20, 2017

Self Defence Law NSW: Protecting Your Home 1





Shocking. So if a woman is raped & murdered, you must let them go & not injure them or kill them if they are fleeing the scene. If you are attacked & your life is in danger, you have to PROVE that to a jury if the assailant is killed! If someone breaks into your house & you feel your wife & children are in danger, you can do nothing until you are physically attacked or harmed. If the assailant gets away, then there is nothing to stop them from returning! This self defence issue stinks!

Self defence in Australia

After Gun Control In Australia

15 year old girl leaves anti-gun politicians speechless

Swiss Gun Ownership - The REAL Story

UK Shooting & Firearm Ownership Explained!

So semi automatics are legal in the UK & they have no more gun crimes than in Australia, but semi autos are banned in Australia!!!





Self Defense Laws in Australia.


Another Australian citizen is attacked and he has no way to defend himself from these thugs using machetes. It is against the law in Australia to carry anything specifically for use in self defence. We are not allowed to carry guns, knives, batons, pepper sprays, or tasers. Women are getting raped & murdered, men are being attacked and killed, but the Australian government will not do anything to help us protect ourselves, not on the streets, and not even in our own homes.









Sunday, March 19, 2017

Meeting At Dragon's Claw By Keith H Burgess

In this video you can see the snapsack being used to carry the author's water bottle. The snapsack can be used as your main pack, or it can be used in conjunction with another pack.



A Woodsrunner's Diary: Havresack/Snapsack. More Images.

A Woodsrunner's Diary: Havresack/Snapsack. More Images.: Jacques Lagniet (French, 1620–1672) Tel fait la faute qu'un autre boit [One makes the mistake, another drinks it] Etching bound...

Democrats Love Socialism

Saturday, March 18, 2017

Gun control explored at Clark University program.



Ms. Schwoerer said firearms were around in England since the late 13th century, but didn't play an important role in society until the early 1500s, when Henry VIII ramped up production of guns with the hopes of proving his prowess on the battlefield by making war with France. He purchased artillery from elsewhere in Europe and encouraged gunmakers to set up shop in Britain. In addition to bolstering the military, the focus on production eventually put guns in the hands of people "up and down the social scale," she said.
Guns helped people hunt more effectively, putting more protein on the table. There was an early interest in hunting for sport and protection, but early on, increased access to game meat was a major factor, she said. In a less practical sense, the gun was a novelty and carried with it an aura of power and authority.

Appearance laws: Let's scrap them now

A Woodsrunner's Diary: Banned from Facebook, can you please share this po...

A Woodsrunner's Diary: Banned from Facebook, can you please share this po...: Yesterday I made a comment on one of the groups I belong to on Facebook regarding a video that I did not think was suitable. The group is...

Wednesday, March 15, 2017

States agree on gun control code. AUSTRALIA.


States agree on gun control code
Author: ANDREW DARBY, GERARD RYLE
Date: 26/05/1995
Words: 590
   

   
Publication: The Age
Page: 3
Hobart.
The states took a tentative step towards uniform gun laws yesterday when police ministers agreed to establish a national gun-control code on shooter licensing, mail-order sale, safety training and secure storage.
The Federal Government will also further restrict the importation of ammunition and machine pistols. But those attending the Australian Police Ministers Council yesterday left unresolved a national argument on the registration of all guns.
The federal Justice Minister, Mr Kerr, described yesterday's code decision as ``a step towards uniformity".
He said quick responses to shooting tragedies in different states in recent years had led to ad hoc, potentially conflicting standards. Now ministers had set up a mechanism to take a more considered, long-term view.
Mr Kerr said the latest statistics showed that in 1993, only about 70 of Australia's 526 firearm deaths involved violent crime.
The planned code was welcomed by Victoria's Police Minister, Mr McNamara, as the most significant improvement in decades, and one that would remedy Victorian concerns about the effect of more relaxed laws in other states.
``It's the hoons and lunatics that everyone wants to see firearms removed from," he said. ``We need to look at measures where we can more closely interact with mental health authorities so that we can identify persons who should be prohibited from obtaining firearms."
The NSW Police Minister, Mr Paul Whelan, did not attend the meeting and is awaiting a briefing. Mr Kerr was confident that NSW and the other absent states, Queensland and the Northern Territory, would agree with the proposals.
While all jurisdictions now follow the principle that firearms be securely stored, the provision was variously interpreted. A Western Australian model is being proposed in which guns must be kept in steel cabinets with separate lockable ammunition storage.
The Victorian Justice Department is to coordinate the development of the code, which will be put before the next Police Ministers' Council meeting in Tasmania in November.
The Commonwealth's tightening of imports will outlaw a variety of ammunition, including military ammunition greater than 12.7mm, tracer bullets, armour-piercing and flechette ammunition.
Imports of standard hollow-point and soft-nosed ammunition will still be allowed, but a prohibition on military-style weapons will be extended to pistols configured as semi-automatic machineguns.
The president of the Sporting Shooters Association of Australia, Mr Ted Drane, said there were up to four million licensed shooters who ought to be consulted before changes were made to gun laws.
``We will never have national gun registration because that would mean that too many people (politicians) would lose their seats if they did in places like Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania," he said.
A spokesman said Victoria's chief commissioner of police, Mr Neil Comrie, said he supported uniform gun laws.
THE PROPOSED GUN CONTROL CODE.
Recognition of licensing, perhaps with a categorisation system.
Control of mail order firearm sales.
Firearm safety training standards.
Pistol registration methods.
Secure storage standards.
Regulations governing types of ammunition are to be tightened.

CN Live | Changing the Shooting Age - 3/13/17

Is the Australian Government a registered Corporation in the USA?!


Is the Australian Government a registered corporation? As I understand it, and I must admit that I am not in any way legally minded or very knowledgeable in regards to politics, the idea of a corporation is to make money for it's investors. Now Australian citizens are not investors in a monetary sense IF the Australian Government is a corporation. So, we can't earn any dividends from this corporation, but it is in the interest of the corporation NOT to spend money unless it can also make money.

Funding cuts to public services are obviously making money for someone, but certainly not us. Money spent of firearms registration comes out of our pockets, and again is not for our benefit. Money spent on gun control and gun confiscation is again payed for from our taxes, but again does not benefit us in any way or form. We work all our lives, and part of the deal was that we get a pension when we retire, but again, pensions have been cut and the retirement age extended! All this is putting money into the government coffers, but we the law abiding citizens are not receiving any benefits.
So, can anyone throw any light on this Australian government corporation thing? Is it fact or fiction? Is the Australian government a USA registered corporation?









Turnbull Pushes Mandatory Vaccination Rollout But Has Lucrative shares In Big Pharma





Turnbull Pushes Mandatory Vaccination Rollout But Has Lucrative shares In Big Pharma

Turnbull protecting his investments, not doing it for the good of the people. He also has invested in tobacco! His main concern is NOT for the good of the people, just the opposite.

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

The First Australians Fight Back - John Pilger - The Secret Country - 1985

Australian Government Takes Aim at Guns, Again, After Confiscation Scheme Fails to Disarm Criminals


In other words, the gun confiscation scheme Hillary Clinton praised on October 16, 2016, as “worth looking at” for gun policy in America actually created an uneven playing field where law-abiding citizens turned in their guns while criminals retained theirs.
Read more by clicking on the above link.
With the increase in violent attacks, rape and murder the Australian government still refuse to make it legal for law abiding citizens to carry anything for self defence and for the defence of family and property. The government's aim appears to be to disarm all Australian citizens except the Police and Military, and of course criminals. We are now left in the position of being either a victim or a criminal, we have been left to decide whether we want to risk being carried by 6 or tried by 12. Which do you choose?

Islamic Threat Inside Australia.


Right now I think our own Corporate Government is more of a threat to us than Islam, but the Islamic threat does exist. But instead of meeting this threat head on and banishing offenders back to their own country, the Australian government uses this threat to impose more restrictions on Australian citizen's rights and freedoms!!!



Sunday, March 12, 2017

Did the Australian Government orchestrate the Tasmania massacre? The Port Arthur Massacre – A Mossad Operation


The Port Arthur Massacre
A Planned Event Designed to Disarm the Australian Public
Many of you may not be aware of the Port Arthur Massacre in Tasmania, Australia (the results of which created a sort of gun control) and many may not understand that what happened that day led to many questions being asked which remain unanswered to this day.
One could certainly draw comparisons between the Port Arthur Massacre and Sandy Hook in that the outcome could be the same if the President and the US Government have their way!!!
Below are some findings by other authors and experts, including the police themselves, which upon reading may cause you some concern.


STABBINGS IN AUSTRALIA OVER THE PAST 6 MONTHS





Australians are not legally allowed to carry anything for use in self defence. If they do carry anything for self defence they can be charged with an offence. Items such as capsicum sprays, tasers, batons, knives or guns are all banned for self defence by the Australian government. Australian citizen's & tourist's lives are simply not important to the Australian government. Remember this when next voting.

We need to sack the present government & scrap the present system, it simply is not working for the people. The Australian government, no matter which party is in office, is now a corporation. When voting DO NOT vote for any party that is anti-gun. Our government wants to disarm all Australian citizens except the Police & the military.

Friday, March 10, 2017

PDF For Active Shooter Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering.


Yet again in the PDF (link below) the government blames law abiding gun owners for criminal access to illegal firearms. This is a lie and unfair. Law abiding gun owners have their/our firearms locked away in secure gun safes. Gun thefts from government agencies and purchases on the black market are largely responsible for criminal access to illegal guns. Simple guns are easy to make from items which can be purchased in any major hardware store. It is not rocket science, anyone with a hacksaw, a hand drill and a screw driver can make a shotgun.
Restrictions and controls made on law abiding citizens are done so for one purpose, to control the people. The last gun confiscation by the government did nothing to make the populace safer, on the contrary, home invasions have increased along with other violent crimes.
Australians are given no legal right to carry anything for use in self defence.


National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NATIONAL GUIDELINES for the PROTECTION of PLACES of MASS GATHERING from TERRORISM



Contents


Introduction                                                                                   3

Purpose                                                                                   3

Definition                                                                                        4

Security context                                                                              4

Principles                                                                                        4

Process for engaging with places of mass gathering
at risk from terrorism                                                             5

Risk management in the current environment                                             5

Roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in the
        protection of places of mass gathering                                           6

        Role of the Commonwealth Government                                               6
        Role of the State and Territory governments                                         6
        Role of State and Territory police                                                   6
Role of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee                                     7
Role of owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers       7
Role of Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG)                                 7
Role of the Business Advisory Group (BAG)                                  8
Roles of peak bodies and associations                                            8

Distribution of relevant intelligence and information/communications protocols Current security context Introduction
In November 2009, COAG SOM agreed to recommendations of the Review of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Arrangements, including that work relating to the protection of places of mass gathering should be coordinated by the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).
In December 2009, NCTC noted that the protection of places of mass gathering is most effectively delivered through a business government partnership, and agreed to coordinate at a national level, work associated with protecting places of mass gathering. In December 2010, NCTC agreed to establish the Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG) to operate as a national forum to share information on issues and best practice relating to the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism.
NCTC also agreed to establish a consultative forum with business comprising national and major venue owners and operators, through a Business Advisory Group (BAG), to exchange information, and engage with law enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to the protection of places of mass gathering.
Purpose
Places of mass gathering not only present terrorists with potential opportunities for mass casualties, symbolism and high impact media coverage, they pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. NCTC noted that places of mass gathering have been specifically identified by religious and political extremists as attractive targets.  
All jurisdictions have robust and well tested arrangements for the planning and management of major and specific events. However, determining which places of mass gathering are at higher risk is not an easy task given the sheer number and variations of such places, and the limited security resources available. Once identified, they further present the challenge of what consistent risk mitigation strategies to develop and implement.
This document has been developed to ensure a nationally consistent approach is taken by all Australian jurisdictions in the development of their own guidelines for the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism. The approach supports a systematic process identifying security risk management activities which can be integrated into existing jurisdictional emergency management arrangements. It provides a basis for:

•       identifying places of mass gathering that are vulnerable to the threat of terrorism, and
•       risk management arrangements associated with this threat, based on the roles and responsibilities shared among all private and public stakeholders.
Definition
Places of mass gathering incorporate a diverse range of facilities including, but not limited to, sporting venues, shopping and business precincts, tourism/entertainment venues/attractions, hotels and convention centres, major events and public transport hubs. This also includes significant one off events. They are characterised by having a large concentration of people on a predictable basis and often have a minimum of security controls present. Identification of places of mass gathering for the purpose of this document is based on risk and not on any arbitrary numerical threshold.
Given the pervasive threat to a diverse range of targets, the identification of places of mass gathering cannot be precise.
The identification of places of mass gathering potentially at risk from terrorism should be informed by the current security context.
Security context
The current security context for mass gatherings is provided by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and is at Annexure A.
Places of mass gathering are potential targets for terrorist attack, particularly in larger cities, as they may satisfy the following criteria:
•       provide opportunity for attack in terms of accessibility and vulnerability
•       cause high-impact imagery likely to be generated by an attack
•       have high symbolic value, and
•       have consequences in terms of mass casualties, economic impact and public anxiety in the broader community.

By concentrating large numbers of people at high density in accessible places, at regular or predictable times, mass gatherings present the opportunity for terrorists to inflict mass casualties, cause economic damage, and instil public fear.
Places of mass gathering, or the events themselves, may have symbolic value, or be representative of Western culture. Furthermore, any terrorist attack against a place of mass gathering would generate considerable media interest.
Principles
The national approach is based on the following principles:
•       counter-terrorism preparedness for places of mass gathering focuses on the protection and safety of people
•       all levels of government contribute to the prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery from a terrorist incident, including local government
•       event managers and owners and operators of places of mass gathering are responsible for taking reasonable steps to ensure the protection and safety of people
•       prevention and preparedness arrangements for protection from terrorism are
underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach
•       security arrangements for places of mass gathering recognise the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat and are responsive to changes in the security environment, and
•       effective security outcomes in complex mass gathering environments require cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders.

Note: security at public transport hubs is considered more specifically under the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Surface Transport Security.


Process for engaging with places of mass gathering at risk from terrorism
The national approach relies on an active business government partnership. This partnership will be achieved through three principal methods of engagement based on an intelligence-led, risk management process.
•       Guided self assessment: all owners and operators of places of mass gathering have an obligation to consider the risk of terrorism in their security and emergency planning processes. Governments should make available tools through which owners and operators can self assess the risk of terrorism to their operation.
•       Top down: intelligence-led advice will be provided to owners and operators when relevant.
•       Bottom up: specific responses to enquiries from industry/owners and operators about the threat of terrorism to their operations will be provided. The exchange of information and engagement with law enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to the protection of places of mass gathering will occur via the BAG.


Risk management in the current environment
The Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) is the standard by which all places of mass gathering will be assessed. In accordance with ISO 31000:2009, it is first necessary to establish the strategic context for actual and potential threats. In the current security environment, all security risk assessment processes should consider terrorism in all its forms. Refer to Annexure A.
Following completion of an assessment, the development of appropriate security and on-site emergency management plans may be an appropriate treatment strategy. Additionally owners and operators should engage with State and Territory and local governments regarding recovery issues.

Roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in the protection of places of mass gathering
Role of the Commonwealth Government
The Commonwealth Government has responsibility to:

•       communicate relevant intelligence and information to State and Territory government stakeholders, and other relevant stakeholders
•       participate in the promulgation of a nationally consistent approach to the protection of places of mass gatherings
•       where relevant, liaise with and support State and Territory governments in providing protective security arrangements for places of mass gathering
•       regulate aviation and maritime industry participants, based on a preventative security approach
•       assist industry through peak bodies and advisory groups as appropriate
•       coordinate the establishment of a task force for major events where Commonwealth Government action is required, and
•       manage and coordinate public information and the media at a national level.

Role of State and Territory governments
State and Territory governments have responsibility to:  

•       provide leadership and whole-of-government coordination in implementing the nationally consistent approach for the protection of places of mass gathering by providing owners and operators with jurisdictionally or otherwise developed guidance material
•       where relevant liaise with the Commonwealth Government on mass gathering protection arrangements
•       communicate relevant information through jurisdictionally agreed arrangements, and
•       manage and coordinate public information and the media within the jurisdiction.

Role of State and Territory police
Where appropriate, State and Territory police have responsibility to:

•       assist in the provision of protective security guidance (as deemed appropriate by the respective police service/force) to event organisers and owners and operators of places of mass gathering and develop protective security strategies to counter terrorism
•       advise event organisers and owners and operators of places of mass gathering of relevant threat information, in accordance with jurisdictional arrangements
•       communicate directly with owners and operators of places of mass gathering where there is an imminent and specific threat and coordinate the operational response, and
•       establish and maintain liaison with owners and operators of places of mass gathering in accordance with jurisdictional arrangements.

State and Territory police also have operational responsibility for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism and investigate terrorist activity, threats and incidents.



Role of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee
The NCTC (senior representatives from relevant Commonwealth Government agencies and First Ministers’ departments and police from each jurisdiction) has responsibility to build national capability and promote the protection of places of mass gathering in a manner consistent with broader counter-terrorism arrangements. The NCTC supports the operation of the MGSG to provide a conduit for the national exchange of information within a government and business partnership via collaboration with the BAG. This model seeks to create a culture of collaboration between stakeholders to improve Australia’s capacity to operate in a heightened terrorism environment.
Role of owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers
Owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers are encouraged to:

maintain an awareness of their operating environment
provide adequate security for their assets, based on threat and risk
actively apply risk management techniques to their planning processes
conduct regular reviews of risk assessments and security, emergency and contingency plans
report any incidents or suspicious activity to State or Territory police
develop and regularly review business continuity plans, including identifying interdependencies
conduct training and exercise their security, emergency and contingency plans, and
participate in government exercises to assist in harmonising prevention, response and recovery arrangements with relevant controlling agencies.

Role of the Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG)
The MGSG shall:
provide a forum for all jurisdictions to share information, initiate strategies and/or oversight activities on issues and best practice relating to the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism, and
supplement and support existing or proposed arrangements within jurisdictions, and coordinate at a national level the work associated with protecting places of mass gathering, recognising the varying capabilities of jurisdictions.


Role of the Business Advisory Group (BAG)
The BAG shall:

•       operate as a forum for national and major venue owners and operators to exchange information, and engage with law enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to the protection of places of mass gathering.

Roles of peak bodies and associations
Peak bodies and associations are encouraged to disseminate and promote information in consultation with the BAG to support the nationally consistent approach to the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism.
Distribution of relevant intelligence and information/communications protocols
ASIO is the national assessing authority for security threat assessments and security intelligence reports (SIR). Threat assessments and SIR are prepared on the basis of information available from Commonwealth Government, State and Territory resources, overseas liaison and open sources. From time to time, specific risks or threats may emerge that require an immediate response. On these occasions, a well coordinated but more operationally focussed response will be required from governments and industry.
Responsibility for the distribution of relevant intelligence and information is summarised below.
•       ASIO has responsibility to provide intelligence to relevant Commonwealth Government departments and agencies, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and State and Territory police.
•       In the knowledge of an imminent and specific threat, ASIO will liaise with the State and Territory police, owners and operators of places of mass gathering and other relevant stakeholders.
•       State and Territory police liaise with relevant owners and operators of places of mass gathering, in accordance with jurisdictional arrangements, to provide information on the national and localised security threat context. Police will communicate directly with key bodies where there is an imminent and specific threat and will coordinate the operational response. Police also gather and disseminate intelligence to relevant agencies as required and as appropriate.
•       State and Territory governments liaise with relevant owners and operators of places of mass gathering, in accordance with jurisdictional arrangements, to promote the harmonisation of prevention, response and recovery plans between governments and owners and operators of places of mass gathering.
•       The owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers are expected to provide adequate security of their assets, including staff and pass information to the police on incidents and specific activities such as hoaxes/threats, unusual purchases or thefts, unusual training, or apparent surveillance.

While some overlap may occur in information being passed from industry peak bodies to their constituency and the mechanisms within States and Territories, this is preferable to the possibility that information might not be passed to some owners and operators of places of mass gathering.
Current security context
 The main terrorist threat to Australia emanates from al-Qa’ida (AQ) and Islamist terrorists inspired by AQ’s world view. Public statements by AQ figures and other extremists continue to criticise Australia, and identify Australians and Australian interests as legitimate targets. 

Despite international counter-terrorism efforts, AQ retains the intent and capability to conduct terrorist attacks and to operationally influence like-minded terrorist networks to undertake attacks. The threat to Australian interests domestically and overseas from AQ like-minded groups will endure for the foreseeable future.

Critical infrastructure and places of mass gathering feature prominently in terrorist attacks linked to AQ and its affiliates – characterised by their symbolic nature, concentration of people in enclosed spaces and economic and social importance. Terrorist attacks have targeted government buildings, diplomatic and consular offices, commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist facilities, residential compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation, oil and other energy and transport infrastructure. The aviation sector remains a particular focus for AQ and its affiliates.

AQ and like-minded terrorist networks have considered, undertaken and trained for a range of attack methodologies, including suicide bombing using person-borne and vehicle-borne (car, truck, boat and plane) improvised explosive devices, assassination, missile attack and remote-control truck bombing.

Conventional and improvised weapons remain the primary feature of terrorist attacks, despite terrorist groups having an interest in, and having ready access to, information on cyber attacks and on weapons of mass destruction. Innovation and ingenuity in circumventing security measures is a feature of terrorist attacks. However, past plots may not provide a basis for future attack planning.
 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

September 2010